An influential and perhaps dominant view of ourselves as a species focuses more on the aggressive and destructive sides of our nature than on the more positive ones. This is probably a legacy from Freud and the popular ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz and Desmond Morris and also the result of the antisocial behaviors that we do see or hear about. I suggest that the resulting perception of ourselves is wrong. Rather, human beings might better be characterized as helpful, cooperative, empathic, loving, kind, and considerate. It is not for this reason that acts of violence and destruction result so readily in moral outrage and behavior?
money to people who request it.3 Even on the New York subway people are altruistic; in one study, the investigator fell to the ground pretending to have a knee injury. When this happened, 83 percent of the people in the subway car offered their help.4 Three-to five-year-old children also engage in altruistic behavior toward both peers and teachers. In one study of twenty-six preschoolers, over thirty hours of free-play activity were observed. It was found that each child engaged in an act of cooperation, sharing, helping, or comforting on average fifteen and one-half times per hour.5 Altruistic behavior is a very human activity, it occurs at a very high rate and is ubiquitous.
THE DEFINITION OF ALTRUISM
What do all these acts of rescue, sacrifice, donation, and helping have in common to warrant their inclusion in the superordinate category of altruism? One common characteristic is that they are all behaviors that benefit another. One formal definition proposed by two psychologists is "behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources. '6 This defines altruism in terms of both intention and behavior and is probably a typical definition among psychologists. Not all behavioral scientists would accept this, however. Sociobiologists, for example, define altruism only in terms of behavior: in other words, if an organism's acts increase the survival of another organism at the expense of the altruist, then that act is by definition altruistic. There are no intentions involved. In this way even plants could be altruistic. (Plants would be altruistic if, for example, they suppressed their own growth in favor of that of another plant.)7 Still other behavioral scientists have stipulated that altruism is not a property of behavior at all but rests entirely on the intentions behind the action. Indeed, some have required that the intention rest on the particular motivational state of empathy before it can be called "true" altruism. 8 The definition that I personally find most useful is "social behavior carried out to achieve positive outcomes for another rather than for the Ethics April 1982
self." In this formulation, egoism is at the opposite end of the continuum from altruism and is defined as "social behavior carried out to achieve positive outcomes for the self rather than for another."9 Such a definition certainly will not satisfy everybody, and particularly not those who prefer to define altruism in terms of particular forms of intention. However, keeping to a definition in primarily objective, behavioral terms certainly does not preclude a search for the possible psychological motivations that activate the behavior. Indeed two such postulated internal mechanisms will be discussed shortly. For the present, however, let us note that there is a class of behaviors which are carried out that benefit others, that most people consider such behavior by their peers a virtue, and that it is useful to have a word for such behavior, and "altruism" is the one designated.
To the behavioral scientist as well as to the social engineer, such behaviors are of great interest. Indeed, complex societies cannot exist without a large degree of concern for others on the part of the populace. This article will specify some of the means by which society influences the degree of altruism in existence.
THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM
The behavioral emphasis in the definition of altruism becomes particularly advantageous when we consider altruism in other animal species that, like our own, live in social groups. These vary from the social insects such as ants, bees, and wasps, through to birds, dogs, dolphins, and chimps. All these species engage in considerable amounts of behavior we would call altruistic if they were engaged in by humans. Examples include parental care, mutual defense, rescue behavior, cooperative hunting, and sharing food. It is the social insects such as the ants that are the most altruistic. If nest walls are broken open, soldier ants pour out and engage in combat with foraging ants from other nests. Meanwhile, behind them, worker ants repair the broken walls. Many of the soldier and worker ants will die in combat, sacrificing their lives in order to save their nest mates. Altruism in animals presents a problem for theories of evolution. Darwin's theory, for example, stresses natural selection and survival of the "fittest" individuals. How then do behaviors arise, such as altruism, that appear to diminish the personal fitness of individual's engaging in them? The final solution to this paradox is of only recent origin and involves the concept of kin selection. Genes survive and are passed on in offspring. If an animal sacrifices its own life for its sibling's offspring, it ensures the survival of common genes, for it shares 50 percent of its genes with its sibling and 25 percent with its nephew or niece. The percentage of genes shared therefore should be an important influence on the amount of altruism displayed. The case of the social ants makes this clear. Female worker ants tend to be sterile for most of their lives and engage in much altruistic self-sacrifice for their sisters. As mentioned before, they are the most altruistic species so far discovered. They also share three-fourths of their genes 9. Rushton, Altruism, p. 8. with their sisters. By devoting their entire existence to the needs of others and sacrificing their lives if need be, they are in fact helping to propagate their own genes. They do this not through self-reproduction (the original Darwinian idea of individual fitness) but by helping the reproductive success of those with whom they share genes (the newer idea of inclusive fitness). Thus the appropriate analysis for understanding natural selection is the gene rather than the individual organism. As Wilson dryly put it, "The organism is only DNA's way of making more DNA" (p. 3). 1O Dawkins, a popularizer of sociobiology, even titled his book The Selfish Gene." Any means by which a pool of genes, in a number of individuals, can be transmitted more effectively into the next generation will be adopted. Here, it is suggested, are the origins of self-sacrificial altruism. Altruism is simply a phenomenon by which genes can be more readily transmitted, a mechanism by which DNA multiplies itself more effectively.
Critics might question how behaviors such as running into burning automobiles to rescue strangers from otherwise certain death are explained by such a theory. The answer lies in human history. One and a half million years ago, when human altruism evolved, such dramatic behaviors did in fact propagate the actor's own genes because people lived within a tribe of individuals who all were more or less directly related to one another. Today our genes are still fulfilling the same function, as though the stranger were more genetically similar to us than he or she in fact is.
Although evolutionary theory suggests that the basic (genetic) nature of Homo sapiens is altruistic it must be emphasized that much of human behavior is acquired through social learning. This is particularly necessary to emphasize when we consider the question of individual differences in altruism. Unlike the social insects, I would argue, we are altruistic primarily because we have learned to be so, being genetically programmed to learn from our environments.
MOTIVATIONS TO BE ALTRUISTIC
Altruism was defined earlier in behavioral terms, that is, as "social behavior carried out to achieve positive outcomes for another rather than for the self." Another way of looking at the question of altruism is to examine the psychological mechanisms activating the behavior. Most of the research literature concerned with altruism can be usefully organized under one of the two motivational systems of empathy and personal standards.'2 Empathy can be defined as the matching or understanding of A's emotion by B. This occurs either directly, as a result of immediate cues, or cognitively, through role taking. Personal standards can be defined as internalized rules by which events are judged and on that basis approved or disap-Ethics April 1982
proved. Three types of standards have been posited to account for human altruism: those of social responsibility, of equity, and of reciprocity. Postulating motivations to be altruistic helps to organize disparate data. These motivational systems, however, are "hypothetical constructs"; that is, they cannot be observed directly. They are postulated in order to "explain" the regularities in behavior that can be observed. Let us examine a couple of illustrative studies from each motivational base.
A. Empathy
In one study demonstrating a correlation between empathy and altruism, the psychophysiology (skin conductance, blood pulse, heart rate) of observers was measured as they observed a supposedly similar or dissimilar other win money and experience painful shocks while playing a game.'3 Those who believed they were similar to the performer reacted more strongly than did those who believed they were different from him. Those feeling "similar" also reported identifying more with the performer and feeling worse while he waited to be shocked. When subsequently required to choose between helping themselves at a cost to the performer or helping the performer at a cost to themselves, those who previously had reacted the most empathically now behaved the most altruistically! In another study on this topic, participants were given false feedback about their level of emotional arousal while listening to a broadcast in which a person needed help. Those who were led to believe they were experiencing the most emotional arousal were the most likely to offer their help.'4 Thus these two studies demonstrate the importance of "empathy" for motivating helping behavior.
B. Standards of Appropriate Behavior
One way in which it is possible to examine whether there are particular rules is to break them and see what happens. If there is a rule in operation, some form of restitution might be expected to occur. A number of experiments induced people to break "the norm of social responsibility" by causing them unintentionally to harm another person. In one, students were led to believe that they had delivered either shocks or only loud buzzes to another person during the course of an experiment on "learning under punishment." After the "learning" part of the study was over, the student and the other person were asked to fill out a brief questionnaire. While they were filling out these questionnaires, the other person turned to the student and asked him to help make a number of telephone calls to enlist support to save the California redwood trees. The results are very impressive. Only one-quarter of the students who had delivered buzzes agreed to take any names, but three-quarters of those who had delivered shocks were willing to help.'5 In another study, it was found that students induced to tell a lie subsequently administered more shocks to themselves than those who did not lie.'6 Finally, in a field experiment some individuals were reprimanded either for touching art objects in violation of museum rules or for feeding unauthorized food to animals in a zoo. Those who were reprimanded subsequently helped another person more than those not reprimanded. Furthermore, the more severe the reprimand was, the more the person subsequently helped.'7
THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY
In the previous section, two major motivations for altruism-empathy and personal standards-were discussed. The question arises: are some people more empathic and/or normatively altruistic than others; that is, is there such a thing as "the altruistic personality"? In order to answer this question we first must ask a preliminary question in regard to whether there is any consistency in altruistic behavior: do people who tend to be altruistic in one situation also tend to be altruistic in others?
For 
A. Empathy
Studies carried out with both high school and university students have found that the way in which the students completed a thirty-three-item empathy questionnaire predicted whether they would engage in altruistic behavior. The empathy questionnaire consisted of such positively keyed items as "it makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group" and "I really get involved with the feelings of the character in a novel" and negatively keyed items as "I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness." The measures of altruistic behavior included whether the person would administer a high level of electric shock to another person when ordered to do so, volunteering to help an emotionally upset person, and helping out in a dull, hour-long task.20 In another study, carried out with prisoners, it was found that groups characterized as high in "psychopathy" (as measured on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI] Psychopathic deviate [Pd] scale) were far less autonomically responsive (as measured by heart rate and skin conductance) to the sight of emotional distress in others than those low in psychopathy.2' This study therefore supported the often-stated proposition that psychopaths are indifferent to the feelings of others.
B. Standards of Appropriate Behavior
The "Character Education Inquiry," mentioned earlier, found a positive relationship between the children's knowledge of, and agreement with, general moral rules and their prosocial behaviors. More recently, a variety of researchers have attempted to measure personal standards such as the norm of social responsibility among adults. They administered questionnaires composed of items such as "I am the kind of person people can count on" and "if a good friend of mine wanted to injure an enemy of his, it would be my duty to stop him." Subsequently, they investigated whether responses to such questions predicted a variety of altruistic acts ranging from making cardboard boxes for someone allegedly dependent on the person for his or her help, to helping a victim in a faked epileptic seizure situation, to donating money to a charity.22
Of particular interest in one study was the finding that individuals who scored high on measures of moral reasoning, as assessed by Kohlberg's dilemmas, also scored high on traditional questionnaires of moral attitudes and engaged in more helping in a situation that allowed for such behavior.23 Many other studies also have found that individuals with "high" levels of moral judgment, as assessed in response to both Kohlbergian and Piagetian dilemmas, are the ones who are the most altruistic in their behavior. These studies differed considerably from each other in terms of the age range tested, the measures of moral judgment used, and the indices of altruistic behavior assessed.24 In one study, for example, the moral reasoning of adults was measured by Kohlberg Although differences do exist among learning theorists, perhaps it is the similarities that are more striking. The essential similarities appear. to be (a) the focus on observable behavior as the phenomena to be explained; (b) the focus on the laws governing the acquisition, maintenance, and modification of observable behavior (i.e., the "laws of learning"); and (c) a preference for analyzing and coming to an understanding of behavior through experimentation and scientific method. Some of the ways in which children and adults have learned to be prosocial will now be considered. Four procedures of learning will be outlined: classical conditioning, observational learning, reinforcement learning, and learning from such verbal procedures as instructions and preaching. In one experiment, with six-and eight-year-old girls, a pleasurable feeling in the child was attached to the joyous verbalizations of an adult.27 In the critical experimental condition, whenever an adult joyously said "There's the light," she hugged the child. Later, under testing conditions, the child who had had this conditioning preferred to press a lever that resulted in the adult joyously saying "there's the light" than a lever that resulted in candy for the child. By contrast, in control conditions in which the joyous verbalization of "there's the light" had not been associated with hugging and subsequent pleasure for the child, the child pressed the lever for candy. In an experiment on empathic distress, seven-and eightyear-old girls heard verbal expressions of distress by an adult who clutched her ears and grimaced while listening to noise.28 In one condition the child experienced the aversive noise in association with the distress cues of the adult, while in another condition she did not. In a series of test trials, the child was faced with another person who showed distress. When this happened, children who had gone through the appropriate conditioning trials helped the person more than those who had not had the empathy training. 
C. Observational Learning of Prosocial Behavior
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of behaviors from aggression to language acquisition to psychopathology. 29 Learning from the observation of others also has been shown to be a powerful influence on prosocial behavior.30 One or two of these studies will be discussed here. One procedure for investigating the observational learning of altruism involves a game in which children are able to win tokens exchangeable for prizes at the end of the game-the more tokens, the better the prize given. The tokens, therefore, are of some value to the children. At a later time the children are given the opportunity of anonymously donating some of their tokens to a charity. This test of children's generosity appears to be, psychometrically, both reliable and valid.3' It is within this type of setting that observational learning can be studied. For example, children may see an adult playing the same game and then behaving generously or selfishly with the tokens won. The results of numerous studies carried out in such situations demonstrate that children readily internalize the patterns of generosity or selfishness to which they are exposed. Furthermore, such effects have been shown to endure across both time and situation. For example, in one study children exposed to generous models donated nearly 50 percent of their winnings whereas those exposed to selfish models donated less than 5 percent of theirs (compared with their normal tendency, in this situation, to give about 25 percent).32 In a subsequent study, children were exposed to a model who donated either 0, 13, or 50 percent of his tokens to a charity. 33 The results demonstrated that children readily learned what the "appropriate" standard was for donating.
Many other studies have demonstrated experimentally the "power of positive example" for transmitting new standards of behavior. One showed that preschoolers learned to keep working at a boring task and resist a temptation to play with attractive toys through observation of another.34 Children who saw someone give in to a temptation were later unable to resist, whereas those who saw a model exhibit self-control were later able to resist temptation. Furthermore, these results endured over time and generalized to a third measure. This experiment, therefore, provided evidence that learning self-control and resisting temptation could also be acquired through the observation of others. Similarly powerful effects of observational learning have been found in adults. In one experiment, modeling significantly increased the number of female observers who (a) volunteered to donate blood (67 vs. 25 percent), and (b) in turn actually gave their blood (33 vs. 0 percent).35 In this study, the opportunity to actually give blood was not assessed until, on average, six weeks after the commitment and in a setting quite different from the original modeling.
D. Learning through Reinforcement and Punishment
Modeling is a particularly useful way of getting children to learn. Once children try out what they see others doing the question becomes whether or not they will continue to perform it. To a large extent this rests on the consequences that the children's actions bring for them (i.e., whether they result in positive reinforcement or punishment). A large number of studies have demonstrated that stable behavior patterns can be built up by the rewarding and punishing consequences of the behavior. The central principle of B. F. Skinner's theory of operant behavior is that when an operant (behavior) is followed by reinforcement (reward or avoidance of punishment) the probability of its later occurrence is increased. It now also appears to be true that when an operant is followed by a punishment the probability of its later occurrence is decreased. Several studies have demonstrated this to be true for children's altruism too.36
For a long time now punishment as a process of socialization has had short shrift in psychological theorizing, although the tide does seem to be changing to a more balanced view. Recently, more theorists appear to be agreeing with the views of H. J. Eysenck that punishment delivered for antisocial behavior effectively decreases, for example, the frequency of cheating, stealing, and being selfish. Eysenck suggested that punishment is effective because conscience is, in part, a conditioned reflex.37 Theorists such as Eysenck have argued that the enormous increase in antisocial behavior around the world is due to the general increase in "permissive ness" over the same time period. From punishment people undoubtedly do construct appropriate rules of social conduct, and these then serve to guide their behavior in the future. Mild punishment can be effective in aiding children to generate their own self-regulatory controls. Which of the two children is naughtier? Why?
Children with "low" levels of moral judgment think Susan is naughtier because she broke fifteen cups rather than only one. Such children are basing their judgments on the consequences of the act. Children with "high" levels of moral judgment, however, think Mary is naughtier because her intentions were wrong, regardless of the consequences. According to Piagetian "stage" theory these represent two quite distinct stages of development which are referred to as "objective" and "subjective" morality, respectively.40
Having assigned children to one or other of these two categories based on their major way of responding to such stories, the investigators then exposed the children to highly salient models who made judgments in a direction opposite to the orientation of the child. Thus children who had previously made judgments based on a rule about the "consequences" of the behavior heard a model make judgments on the basis of the "inten- 
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April 1982 tions" of the actor, while children who had previously made high moral judgments because they based their judgments on the actor's intentions now heard a prestigious model make "low" judgments based on the consequences of the behavior. After this training session, generalization was tested in another room, where a different adult presented more stories and then recorded the child's responses without praising or commenting on them. The results clearly showed that the children's moral judgments shifted in the direction that they had seen modeled. This was true not only for those children who were moved up from an initially low level to a high level but also for those children who were initially high and were now "reversed" in their orientation. These results were later replicated and extended by other investigators. As an important review of all of this literature recently concluded, "No violence is done by treating all of the preceding studies as cases of rule learning. The essential change was always a shift from an initial rule (e.g., 'judge material damage') to the modeled rule (e.g., 'judge subjective intentions').'"'4 Age trends in moral judgments, therefore, are not, according to the social learning view, the result of sequential stage development so much as they are the reflections of cognitive rules that have been abstracted as a result of modeling and reinforcement contingencies. Adults alter their expectations and subsequent teaching, modeling, and reinforcement of their children as those children grow older. For example, very young children are more likely to be punished according to the amount of consequential damage. As they grow older their intentions will be taken into account, and indeed they will be expected increasingly to provide acceptable reasons for their behavior. This viewpoint provides a crucial theoretical demarcation between the cognitive-developmental and social learning research programs. As described above, much of the empirical literature supports the social learning perspective.
Kohlberg has extended Piagetian thinking into a theory of six "stages" of moral development covering adolescence and adulthood. 42 Descriptively the stages demonstrate a progression to an increasingly ethically altruistic set of internalized norms and, empirically, they show a clear increment with age. If Kohlberg's stages are viewed as only descriptive they can be reconceptualized as degrees of internalization of moral rules.43 From this perspective each step up a stage is a step up in terms of "strength of internalization" and consequent degree of rule generalizability. Thus at stages 1 and 2 there is extreme specificity of behavior; a rule is generalized only to the next threatened punishment or promised reward. At stage 3, a rule is considerably more generalized and internalized; now it extends to the peer group and is somewhat resistant to change from mere promises of reward. At stage 4, a rule is generalized even further and extends to the whole of the society; it is sufficiently internalized to resist peer-group pressure, let alone transient blandishments and costs. At higher stages still, of personal conscience, the rule is internalized maximally. The question then becomes: can such rules be internalized as a result of social learning? The answer appears to be "yes. violence shown in the social behavior of viewers. The evidence for this conclusion comes from a variety of different types of investigation: case studies, laboratory experiments, field experiments, and correlational studies.47 All demonstrate the pervasive power that television has to alter the norms of appropriate behavior.
Television not only has the ability to produce harmful effects by depicting antisocial behavior and violence. Television also has the potential of being a force for good. Over thirty different studies have now demonstrated, through experiments carried out in both laboratory and naturalistic settings, that if prosocial content is shown then the viewers' social behavior is modified in a prosocial direction.48 Generosity, helping, cooperation, friendliness, adherence to rules, delaying gratification, and absence of fear can all be increased by television material. This conclusion therefore is a mirror image to that even larger body of evidence on the relationship between television and antisocial behavior. Also there is evidence that television has the ability to affect our expectations of occupational, ethnic group, and sex roles; consumer products; politicians; and expectations from life. The message therefore is quite clear: people learn from watching television and what they learn depends on what they watch.
One conclusion often put forward is that it is time to alter our conception of the nature of the mass media. Television is more than mere entertainment. It is also a source of observational learning experiences and a setter of norms. It helps to determine what people will judge to be appropriate behavior in a variety of situations. Indeed, it has been argued that television has become one of the major agencies of socialization that our society possesses.
C. The Educational System
The educational system's function as an agency for socialization goes back to antiquity and is universal. The native peoples of North America, for example, long before the advent of Europeans, had two broad curricula. The first was a secular one and consisted of learning to hunt and the acquisition of other skills suitable for their society. The second curriculum was a moral, ethical, and religious one. This two-pronged view of education is found in most other societies of the past, including, just for example, Spartan and Athenian Greece and Medieval Europe.
Education in the modern world is also divisible into secular and moral parts. Whereas, however, all nations of the world today provide, or aspire to provide, universal secular education, only some provide inten-
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April 1982 sive moral training. The Soviet educational system, for example, is particularly involved in moral education.49 It has as its aim the propagation of "socialist morality" and the making of the "New Soviet Person." Great stress is put on prosocial behavior, consideration for others, and selfdiscipline and, indeed, some cross-cultural empirical studies have demonstrated that Soviet children are more honest, generally better behaved, and more responsible than their counterparts in the United States.50 Moral education in North American and Western European schools is far less intensive. A fivefold typology of approaches to moral education in the West can be identified: inculcation, moral development, analysis, clarification, and action learning.5' These are not, however, implemented in any major or systematic manner. There is nothing in the West remotely approaching the Soviet educational system in this regard. Indeed, the general feeling among many appears to be that it is not the place of the school to inculcate moral values. This "hands-off" approach no doubt gained a lot of support from the notions of cultural pluralism and moral relativism. According to this view, the United States and most Western nations are pluralistic societies. Different cultural groups have different values. No one had the right, it was argued, to impose his values on anybody else. The traditional idea of using the American public school system to socialize the hundreds of ethnic minorities (and millions of individuals) into a common "melting-pot" mold appeared to be gone forever.
D. Solutions to the Problem of Undersocialization
A bleak situation has been presented. The family is an increasingly ineffective socializer of children, the television system is socializing them in an increasingly antisocial direction, and the educational system is not socializing them at all. Furthermore there is, unfortunately, an accumulation of evidence that this gloomy scenario is actually producing the predicted "undersocialized personality.' 52 One solution to a problem of undersocialization is to increase the frequency of adult-child interactions, thus providing more opportunities for limit-setting and prosocial socialization. One suggestion has been to help parents to be home when their children return from school. This could occur if factories and workplaces employing large numbers of people could be persuaded to introduce flexible work schedules that would enable parents to be home when their children return from school. Another solution is to try to keep families intact and to decrease the number of illegitimate births. The social welfare system might be exam- ined in this regard to see whether it is inadvertently reinforcing undesirable behavior. Social policy can also be used more positively. Perhaps communal raising of children in well-staffed day-care centers could be useful. Indeed, there is no reason why parents who want to spend time raising their children might not be paid to do this at the day-care centers, where they could also take turns helping to care for other children. Certainly the wider society could benefit from the ensuing increased socialization. In regard to the mass media, it has been amply documented by now that our attitudes and values can be demonstrably altered by what we observe on television. Not only is violence and antisocial behavior being portrayed, but much broader attitudes that may be incompatible with an altruistic society are also depicted. Television shows successful people as materially successful and as consumers of advertised products. As a result, the norms of what constitutes the good life that are being internalized are materialistic. Millions of people will feel frustration as the inevitable social comparisons are made. We must alter our conception of what television is: it has become one of the most powerful socializers that our society currently possesses. When this is realized, issues of power and control become important. At the moment, the advertising and television industries exercise virtually unlimited control in the service of their corporate interests, and the public has no direct access to the use of the public airwaves. One researcher has suggested that dissemination and attendant publicization of the violence rates for the different networks, sponsors, and programs might play a part in exerting influence.5 Certainly other consumer advocates have found that disclosure of objectionable practices can result in some amelioration of the practices. If this does not work then perhaps stronger regulatory guidelines and/or legislation will be necessary to stop the pervasiveness of so much antisocial socialization.
Perhaps it is in the educational system, however, that society can most readily make a significant and active contribution to increasing prosocial competencies and motivations. It is time we turned to a far more intensive and disciplined program of prosocial education, in the widest sense of"the term. How a child behaves and reasons and how he clarifies and acts on his values are all important and might be attended to more completely in schools than they are today. Cooperative school work could be encouraged, as could leadership and initiative in helping the less able students. Stress might also be placed, in social studies courses, on the scientific understanding of human society. In early high school there is no reason why psychology and sociology (and evolutionary theory and animal behavior) could not be taught. and woman, which has been dreamed of, thought about, and written of by so many, actually become a reality through the application of positivistic behavioral science? Certainly the techniques are increasingly at our disposal. Perhaps we should implement them.
